Certainty is a delusion…

To be absolutely certain about something, one must know everything or nothing about it”- Henry Kissinger

As the wry old joke goes: “The only certainties in life are death and taxes”, yet human beings like to extend the aura of certainty to areas in which it has no credible place, with sometimes unfortunate consequences.

Even in “hard” science what are sometimes stated or perceived to be “certain” facts (axioms), turn out to be simply untrue, incomplete, or more nuanced and complex- whether the nature of the cosmos and Earth’s place within it, atomic theory, or Newtonian mechanics. Karl Popper stated that for something to be scientific it must be able to be proven false. If things are falsifiable (able to possibly be proven false) then they can be used in scientific studies and inquiry. In other, words, even “certainties” need constantly to be tested.

This fact was brought to mind recently in reading David Quammen’s excellent book “The Tangled Tree: A Radical New History of Life”, which tells the story, amongst other things, of how as recently as 1977 it was axiomatic that the “tree of life” (popularized by Darwin’s work) had only two main branches from its trunk- for bacteria and for eukaryotes (essentially everything else) and that species only changed vertically through mutation and natural selection over time. That was until a molecular biologist called Carl Woese (who was not even looking for the result), realized that, in fact, there are three branches- the two mentioned previously, and what are now called archaea. Not only that, but genes can be swapped between species- via horizontal gene transfer. So much for the certainties of what you were taught in high school biology. In fact, the “tree” is now considered to look more like a tangled web, so perhaps it should be the Thicket of Life?

When it comes to the world of credit risk analysis and management, it would be wonderful if one could be certain of anything and everything! One could then predict the true risk of loss and one’s pricing would be perfect. Dwight Eisenhower (during World War II) pointed out: “Plans are useless, planning is essential.” Of course we build models and make forecasts. These are an essential component of any financial business. However, any experienced analyst knows that actual outcomes can easily be very different from what was assumed because of some unforeseen or unexpected factor (which is one reason why we are also habitually paranoid). The real world places constraints on possible outcomes, but the number and weighting of the variables that go into assessing, say, the risk of default is inherently probabilistic. The real skill lies in understanding the range and scope of potential outcomes over time, and how to manage and mitigate actual outcomes if they deviate significantly from the range of reasonable expectations- planning, not plans, constantly updated.

History also teaches that seemingly minor variations in decision-making or apparently unconnected events can interact and cascade in ways such that what seemed “certain” and inevitable, turns out very differently. At Dunkirk, in 1940, it seemed certain that the trapped British and French forces would be overrun by the Nazi German Wehrmacht. Yet that did not happen, with the outcome that everyone knows.

So, when someone states that they are certain about something (a 100% probability!), the immediate response should be to ask how and why. At Awbury, we believe (and can demonstrate through outcomes) that our approach to risk analysis, management and mitigation is effective in relative and absolute terms; but we would never be so foolish or arrogant as to state that we are absolutely certain of the outcome on any of our transactions. That would be doing ourselves and our partners a singular dis-service. After all, our business model is founded upon assuming real risks.

The Awbury Team


It is the Devil’s excrement…

Readers may recall that this sentiment was uttered in the mid-1970s by Juan Alfonso, formerly Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons of Venezuela, and often called “the Father of OPEC”. In full, it reads: “I call petroleum the devil’s excrement. It brings trouble… Look at this locura [madness]- waste corruption, consumption, our public services falling apart. And debt, we shall have debt for years.”

This was an allusion to the natural resources “curse”, most particularly that caused by the discovery of large oil and gas reserves. A politer term is “Dutch Disease”- namely, the negative impact on an economy of anything that gives rise to a sharp inflow of foreign currency. The currency inflows lead to currency appreciation, making the country’s other products less price competitive on the export market, as well as potentially to the economic and social distortions, endemic mismanagement and corruption to which Alfonso referred. An expectation of future export revenues from oil leads to the avoidance of putting in place sustainable government revenues based upon taxation.

It is a rare country that manages to overcome the “curse”. Canada, Norway and the Netherlands are examples of those that have, albeit with different approaches; while the sheer scale of the US’s economy has muted any material impact over time.

However, the catalogue of the “cursed” is a long one- including Russia, Saudi Arabia, most of the other Gulf states, Iran, Iraq and, of course, Alfonso’s own Venezuela, which is perhaps the most egregious and painful modern example.

In the case of the last, one can argue that it is the archetypal petro-state gone wrong, with oil revenues in the “good times” being used to influence and co-opt potential opposition, as well as to “bribe” the population through a latter-day version of “bread and circuses”. Unfortunately, when the subsequent “bad times” coincided with the demise of a charismatic leader (Chavez) and his replacement by a thuggish plodder (Maduro) desperate to cling to power (and supported by those who had benefitted from the corrupt largesse during the good times- the military, in particular), the result has been one of the most rapid collapses of a still-functioning state into “failed” status in recent history. And entirely self-inflicted.

The sheer scale of the regime’s stupidity beggars belief. No rational government would gut, coerce and starve of investment its primary source of revenues. Yet that is exactly what first Chavez and then Maduro have done to PDVSA, the national oil company (NOC). It used to be axiomatic that, even if the Venezuelan government could barely be trusted to do anything right or rational, it would not jeopardize PDVSA’s ability to produce and deliver oil from Venezuela’s abundant reserves. Nevertheless, that is exactly what has happened, with an end-game of regime change perhaps now in sight.

For underwriters of complex credit risks, such as the Awbury Team, events in Venezuela provide a salutary reminder that one has to judge the outcome of risks that depend on the decisions of others by reference to their track record, incentives and constraints. Assuming that people (and governments, like any other entity, consist of people) will actually act rationally and in their long term interests can prove quite misguided. One should always be willing to factor in the probability that actors and agents will not be rational (by the standards of the person making the assessment).

The Awbury Team


Only the lawyers (and accountants) get rich…

The New York Federal Reserve’s excellent Liberty Street blog recently published a series of 5 posts aimed at assessing the scale of value destruction, both direct and indirect, following the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, which now seems so long ago as to belong to another era.

What many may not realize is that the Chapter 11 proceedings for Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LBHI) and a number of its US subsidiaries are still continuing, a period of time which is apparently some 8 times that of the average Chapter 11 proceeding of 14 months. What may also not be appreciated is that Lehman’s US broker-dealer subsidiary, Lehman Brothers Inc. (LBI), was resolved and liquidated under a separate process under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), which took some 4 ½ years to be essentially completed in March 2013.

These separate processes have had very different outcomes in terms of creditor recovery. In the case of LBI, customers received 100% of their claims- almost USD 190BN. In the case of LBHI and its other US subsidiaries outside the SIPA process, the outcome was much more complex, protracted and unsatisfactory.

When LBHI filed, its senior bonds implied a recovery of 30%, falling to 9% a month later. In early 2011, LBHI estate estimated recovery for its creditors at 16%. In a plan filed in June 2011, allowed claims by third-party creditors totaled USD 362BN, against which recovery, net of expenses, of USD 75BN was expected, or c.21%. The total for 16 distributions made to date is c. USD 94BN against estimated allowed claims of just over USD 300BN, implying a recovery rate of c. 31%. Of course, that is in nominal dollars. Discounted at UST yields, the recovery is c.26%. That brings home just how large the financial impact of the Lehman’s bankruptcy has been, without even taking into account the human and economic costs for its then 25,000 employees, many of whom were pitched into unemployment at a time when the financial system appeared to be in meltdown.

As the blog points out (even though there had been signs of “cracks” within the financial system in 2007), Lehman’s stock reached its all-time high in January 2008, then beginning a decline which accelerated mid-year and turned into a rout after its now-infamous “pre-announcement” on September 10 of disastrous Q3/08 results. Even as late as September 10, LBHI’s senior bonds were at USD 77 (“distressed” levels, but not “bankruptcy imminent”). Interestingly, with hindsight, the proverbial “canary in the coal mine” may well have been “free credit balances” (analogous to bank deposits) in LBI, Even though such balances were supposed to be segregated from those of LBI itself, they declined 60% between May and September 19 (the day on which LBI filed for bankruptcy). Of course, most of this would have been anecdotal and not that easily visible in the timeframe involved.

So, why should anyone care about any of this? Simply because it demonstrates that not only close and predictive monitoring of all counterparties is essential; but that one should also clearly understand the nature of one’s claim, in terms of both legal and structural ranking and subordination. Just accepting what the “market” believes is far from sufficient.

At Awbury, we aim to be rigorous in all aspects of our risk analysis, and that includes legal, regulatory and recovery risks. After all, we are fundamental credit analysts.

As an aside, the professional fees for LBI’s liquidation were USD 1.18BN; while those for LBHI’s continuing Chapter 11 process so far total USD 2.56BN, both according to calculations made by the Liberty Street economists.

The Awbury Team


Energy in Transition…

While the frenzy and hype over the “end of the Hydrocarbon Era” may have abated somewhat, only a fool would conclude that the issue has gone away.

There seems little doubt that we are moving through another period of transition from one primary energy base (hydrocarbons) to a more multi-faceted one- that of renewable energy sources.

Forecasting exactly when and how this transition will occur (and even the extent to which it must) is a mug’s game. Humans have a seemingly innate tendency to extrapolate from what happened in the past far into the future, while at the same time becoming over-enthused about a new technology. This is also coupled, particularly in the case of hydrocarbons (fossil fuels), with the “doom view”- either “oil is going to run out” as propagated by the once-popular Peak Oil scenario, “it’s soon going to be stranded in the ground” in the Peak Demand scenario.

In reality, there are so many factors involved in the current transition that the real skill will be in determining which will exert the most leverage, and the extent to which those will influence the speed and scale of change.

While past may not be prologue, energy transitions tend to take decades, not years. Research by Vaclav Smil shows that it took coal 55 years to go from 5% to 40% of global energy supply; while oil took 60 years for the same shift; and it has taken natural gas 55 years to go from 5% to 25%. If one contemplates the fact that renewables currently provide little more than 3% of overall global energy supplies, one can imagine that their transition to importance, let alone dominance, is unlikely to be measured in years.

Secondly, as the population of the world continues to expand, potentially reaching 10BN (from c. 7.5BN today) at its currently expected peak in 2050 (a forecast that will, no doubt, also be wrong!) absolute energy consumption is only likely to increase, even if some parts of the world (e.g., the EU) strive to reduce it. Existing technologies, based on hydrocarbons, seem more likely to supply that larger population with its energy needs in that timeframe, in the absence of some yet unforeseen technological breakthrough, or a draconian implementation of measures aimed at curbing the risk of irreversible climate change through curtailment of hydrocarbon use. While not impossible, both seem unlikely in the near to medium term.

Thirdly, sources such as hydrological and nuclear power simply do not have the capabilities to meet growing demand, even at the margin- the former because it is limited and localized; the latter because of lingering distrust and extremely long project lead times. Solar and wind are more scalable (as has already been seen), but require use of significant space, raising the issue of alternative land uses unless somehow located offshore.

Fourthly, people sometimes mistake the technology for the solution, rather than an incremental shift in application of an idea. The rise of electric vehicles as replacements for those powered by internal combustion may be inexorable, but some technology has to produce the energy that they will store in their batteries. Renewable sources are no more likely to be the source for that power than any other for now.

None of this is to argue that there will be no transition. Rather, it is to point out that fixating on any one path, technology or timeframe is inherently misguided. If ever a situation called for scenario planning and weighting of both probability and impact, this transition does.

At Awbury, our approach is always to make an analysis of all relevant factors affecting a risk, and then aim to ensure that our portfolio can survive any realistic scenario, however seemingly remote or extreme.

The Awbury Team


Time to re-assess CAT models?

As is now customary, Munich Re released its annual overview of CAT losses (https://www.munichre.com/en/media-relations/publications/press-releases/2019/2019-01-08-press-release/index.html).

While the “headline” numbers of USD 160BN of losses and USD 80BN of insured losses were by no means as severe as the trauma of 2017 (USD 350BN and USD 140BN respectively), nevertheless, the insured losses were almost double the 30-year, inflation adjusted average of USD 41BN.

Of course, one can debate the validity of using simple “inflation adjustments” as a metric for what a “normalized” and average CAT year should produce; and there will be those who, quite reasonably, say that 2 years of results do not constitute a trend.

However, as the world’s population continues to increase and climate volatility seemingly rises, resulting in changing and increased patterns of severity, it would be a foolish risk manager who dismissed the outcomes of 2017 and 2018 as merely an aberration.

Unusually, the event that caused both the largest overall losses (USD 16.5BN) and largest insured losses (USD 12.5BN) was not a windstorm but a wildfire- the so-called Camp Fire in California. This followed a combination of drought, strong winds and difficulty of access to the affected area. Including other large wildfires, such overall wildfire losses in the state in 2018 were USD 24BN, of which USD 18BN (or 75%) was insured- the worst on record, for a second year.

Not surprisingly, Munich Re commented that the greater frequency of “unusual” events and possible links between them should cause insurers to question whether such events were already built into their CAT models. We would hazard that it is improbable that models in place at the start of 2018 included the possibility of 2 very severe wildfire seasons in a row; which begs the question of how quickly and rigorously such events can and will be incorporated and thus flow through to technical pricing models.

The other factor to notice is that, in the most severe events that occurred, the ratio of insured losses to overall losses showed an increasing trend- i.e., the scale of claims for the most severe events was proportionately higher than those seen historically overall in previous CAT years. One could argue that this was happenstance (i.e., California just happened to be the key epicenter in 2018). However, if climate change is leading to new patterns of risk, and these happen to become more concentrated (at least for now) in geographical areas with both a higher economic value and a higher insured loss percentage (because insurance penetration is much higher for that type of risk), changes to models will surely also have to include new assumptions on insured percentages. Otherwise, “negative surprises” will occur.

So, CAT modelers (and their clients and colleagues) will have to decide how to adjust and re-weight their PMLs and EMLs. Not to do so would expose underwriters to the increasing probability that their technical pricing models were no longer fit for purpose, which is hardly helpful in a market that is still struggling to achieve sustainable price increases to compensate for the CAT losses of the past 2 years.

Of course, Awbury does not write any form of property CAT risk. However, we are very much part of the overall (re)insurer ecosystem. As a result, it would be irresponsible of us to pretend that the CAT events of 2017 and 2018 have no relevance. At first order levels, they do not. However, our aim is always to look beyond the obvious to “further order” effects, including how behaviours and risk appetites may change. We would be remiss ourselves in not updating our own expectations and models.

The Awbury Team


Bleeding Edge or Leading Edge…battling entropy…

In this world of constant competition and disruption, everyone needs an “edge” to survive and prosper. This is the received wisdom.

There are too many mediocre businesses that somehow survive, limping along, waiting to be put out of their misery- either by their lenders and capital providers, or through the cleansing effect of bankruptcy. As a result, capital and resources, real and intellectual, are misallocated, with a cost to the economy and society.

Of course, it is easy to say that one needs and has an “edge”- both individuals and organizations like to believe that they are above average and more effective than their peers or competitors. However, that is not only mathematically impossible, but patently untrue. Just look around at any industry.

The Second Law of Thermodynamics states: “as one goes forward in time, the net entropy (degree of disorder) of any isolated or closed system will always increase (or at least stay the same)”. In other words, lives, businesses, our planet and the universe all tend towards disorder.

As the Shane Parrish of the excellent Farnam Street blog (www.fs.blog) said in a recent post (entitled “Battling Entropy: Making Order of the Chaos in Our Lives”) “Uncontrolled disorder increases over time”, as systems, societies and businesses have a tendency to dissolve into chaos.

So, in order to move forward and maintain or increase one’s “edge” over one’s competition, one has to make inputs that, when combined, increase control, combat disorder, and provide a net positive value to one’s clients and partners. Most new businesses fail over a relatively short period of time after they are established- even in the S&P 500, comprised of the US’s largest companies, the rate of disappearance has increased over time.

The following quotation (from Roger Zelazny, in Doorways in the Sand) sums up this reality very well: “…there is a law of evolution for organizations as stringent as anything in life. The longer one exists, the more it grinds out restrictions that slow its own functions. It reaches entropy in a state of total narcissism. Only people sufficiently far out in the field get anything done, and every time they do they are breaking half a dozen rules in the process.”

Consider the above in the context of any large, bureaucratic organization. In theory, the order created by systems, procedures, committees and oversight is beneficial and essential for the organization to survive. However, over time, in the absence of constant and diligent re-assessment and intelligent adaptation, organizations’ abilities to get things done and add value decay; and, when the inputs in terms of capital and labour exceed the value (profit exceeding cost of capital) generated, an organization is on borrowed time in terms of its ability to survive for any length of time.

Order is essential, but it must be balanced by creativity; and there is a constant dynamic interplay between these two forces: an organization left to its own devices trends towards entropy, so it needs organizing structure and systems. However, too many structures and systems lead to stagnation and ossification and eventually kill the organization, so it is actually important to maintain a degree of chaos and disorder, and focus on staying far out in the field in terms of innovation to battle complacency. The leading edge is never far from the bleeding edge, and maintaining a balance is hard.

At Awbury, even after 7 value-creating years, we are well aware that we cannot afford to be complacent; nor can we become consumed by the “beauty” of bureaucratic and systemic order. If we do not constantly renew and adapt our capabilities, balancing control with creativity (intellectual property creation) we will run the risk, like every other entity, of succumbing to entropy and decay.

We have no intention of doing so.

The Awbury Team


Earth Wind and Fire,

Readers of a certain age will recognize the title as a reference to a legendary, genre-spanning music group created in 1969. One could alternatively go back a few thousand years to the Ancient Greeks, who believed that the world was made up of 4 elements, Water, Air, Fire and Earth.

(Re)insurers have long taken earth(quake), wind(storm) and (flood)water seriously in their CAT models, but have tended regard fire as a less likely catastrophic risk, with lower PMLs. This is slightly ironic in the context of the fact that most of the original insurance companies, in the UK and the US, were established to cover fire risks, including Benjamin Franklin’s The Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insurance of Houses from Loss by Fire, founded in 1752.

All that will (or should) now have changed, as estimates for losses from the current spate of wildfires in California run to USD 19BN and are still rising- not, in itself, a threatening amount for (re)insurers’ capital, but nevertheless approaching the levels seen in the other categories. Equally disturbingly, frequency has increased as well as severity.

We are sure, therefore, that firms such a RMS, AIR and Eqecat are rushing to review and update their models, as are the modelling teams in all the major CAT (re)insurers and brokers. It will be interesting to see whether and how events affect pricing and capacity during the forthcoming 1/1 renewal period. Not only that, but it will surely cause corporate risk managers, particularly for power utilities, to re-assess the size of limits they need. After all, one only has to look at the impact of the California wildfires on PG&E’s share price and credit spreads.

So, what lessons and observations can be taken away from such events?

Firstly, that “old” risks, such as fire, that were, no doubt, thought be well understood, can still mutate and cause surprises.

Secondly, if a combination of forest management practices, changing weather patterns and human encroachment can cause such devastating outcomes as in California, which other concentrations of economic value could be vulnerable now and in the future?

Thirdly, tensions between regulators, insureds and (re)insurers are likely to increase. To cover potential losses, rates should increase, but (like flood insurance) homeowners, at least in the US, believe they have a right to build even in areas known to be vulnerable.

Fourthly, the lack of long-term data points is going to make building effective models more difficult, because no-one really knows what reasonable parameters should now be.

Fifthly, new technologies and management practices are likely to evolve to address both the risk and the opportunity.

The overarching point is that even experts can become complacent that the boundaries of certain risks are well understood and so vigilance perhaps wanes. People obsess over “emerging” risks, while overlooking the fact that long-standing assumptions are just that- and need the same periodic re-assessment as any other CAT or (re)insurance risk. Catastrophic fire risk should be a white swan amongst the grey and the black, not a surprise.

As we have said before, to survive, prosper and avoid ruin, one has constantly to re-examine, re-assess and test one’s models and assumptions. Being paranoid helps!

The Awbury Team