Geo-politics and the art of randomness…

Trying to predict trends across the geopolitical landscape is always interesting, particularly when there is so much noise around, which makes determining what is material and potentially threatening into an exercise in probability-weighted scenario analysis.

Some examples:

Italy: will the pending coalition government of Five Star Movement and Lega Nord, become a comedy of errors or commedia dell’arte?

Malaysia: will Dr. Mahathir Mohamad really be willing to curb his hitherto autocratic tendencies and cede his role to his former protégé and nemesis, Anwar Ibrahim?

Argentina: a call for help to the IMF. Will it result in stabilization, or political defeat for economic reforms?

North Korea: who knew that a hitherto hermit hereditary dictator could be so charming, as well as deeply paranoid (not without reason)?

ZTE: political target; collateral damage; or the excuse for a rapprochement between the US and the PRC?

Of course, history is littered with examples of events that, while noteworthy, did not seem that important at the time, but turned out to have momentous consequences:

– Germany facilitating Lenin’s return to Russia in 1917
– Just another political assassination in Sarajevo in 1914
– Nixon’s visit to China in 1972
– The fashion for garage workshops in the Bay Area in the 1970s

As Kierkegaard said: “Life can only be understood backwards, but must be lived forwards”- at least in this universe. Discerning those events or factors which are truly important is far from simple.

All this makes the life of an underwriter an exciting one, as he or she tries to decide whether what is happening is just a sideshow and distraction; a mask for hidden trends; the first order in a subsequent cascade; or the emergence of a new category of risk.

The ZTE situation is worth pondering. While supply chain risk is not exactly something new, the fact that a significant PRC manufacturer was essentially put out of business overnight through unconstrained executive diktat, and then potentially given a stay of execution on further whim, is evidence that applying logic and rational thought to risk assessment is not always enough. Arguably, there should now be a “ premium” (and not of the beneficial sort) applied to any obligor that is a potential hostage to political fortune and caprice, and not just in relation to the US, as other governments are more than capable of such actions.

And what is one to make of underwriting the risks of exposure to a company, Tesla, whose CEO and dominant shareholder decides that “joking” very publicly about impending bankruptcy, or refusing to answer “boneheaded” questions is an appropriate exercise of management discretion? This may seem containable in risk terms- but, given the Cult of Elon, the failure of Tesla would almost certainly have not just direct industry impact, but also reverberate well beyond the United States, for example potentially calling into question market assumptions for cobalt demand and pricing (and thus affecting the DRC).

Amidst all the cacophony, the Awbury Team continues to focus on originating, analyzing, structuring and pricing risks that are highly unlikely to be “side-swiped by randomness”; ensuring that returns contain an ample safety margin; while constantly scanning our environment for changes that could be material with a view to keeping well ahead of the arc of creative destruction.

The Awbury Team

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Red Dragons and Bald Eagles…

The range of conflicts and confrontations between the US and the PRC seems ever present in the news headlines, with reaction following action in what seems like an endless loop. Of course, Russian revanchism; machinations on the Korean peninsula; and the various potential “flashpoints” in and around the Middle East add further layers of distraction.

However, the tensions between the US and the PRC amount to rather more than headlines, “sound bites” and political posturing- it is all much more serious than that, as the US, a constitutional democracy, is dealing with an unconstrained autocracy, which does not even subscribe to the rule of law.

A contest is clearly under way between the world’s two largest economies for supremacy over whatever global power structure they wish to create, or allow to exist. After World War II, the former Soviet Union and its satellites clearly lost a prior battle with the US, no matter what President Putin and his sycophants and fellow travelers may think, during a period when the PRC was first walled-off from the wider world and then internally-focused on re-building its industrial base and infrastructure. Until quite recently, the PRC had adhered to the approach formulated by Deng Xiaping of “keeping a cool head and maintaining a low profile”; and even the PRC’s current President (and now paramount leader) Xi Jinping would state that the PRC was no threat to anyone.

Now, in a scenario exacerbated by the “zero-sum” approach to international relations adopted by the current Administration, the PRC’s leadership is starting to push back, seemingly confident that it has the support of its vast population (over which it is re-exerting ever more control); knowing that the entangled supply chains and expansion plans of many US businesses lead back to the PRC; and relishing the fact that, through its treatment of them, the US seems now to go out of its way to weaken the support of its supposed allies.

Of course, this is not to say that a direct “kinetic” confrontation is inevitable; nor that the PRC seeks an outright “trade war” with the US (which any rational person realizes benefits neither party, nor the wider world economy). Nevertheless, the tone has changed, with both sides increasingly testing and probing the other to understand how far a particular course can be followed before provoking a reaction. A prime example of this is the increasing “fact” that the South China Sea is now a maritime buffer zone for the PRC, which clearly intends to force the US’s Pacific Fleet out of being able to control the area in the event of war (say, provoked by a PRC decision finally to “incorporate” Taiwan into the Middle Kingdom). No doubt, many interesting war games are being conducted by the general staffs of both the PRC and the US.

The optimistic scenario would have the US and the PRC realizing that co-operation is better than confrontation, particularly given how intertwined their economies truly are. A more pessimistic one would be the PRC’s leadership taking the view (not unreasonably) that its own population is far better conditioned to bear pain, than that of the US, and at some point no longer seeking compromise in the face of what it might consider provocations, or the attempted humiliation by one great power of another. So, the real question becomes: at what point does either party believe that it has the ability to “win” an outright confrontation, and what means will it choose to do so? A direct military confrontation is possible (as there is an increasing range of “flashpoints”); but a more likely scenario is a combination of economic “warfare”, cyber-confrontation, and proxy wars of the sort fought between the US and the former Soviet Union.

At some point, we are likely to find out.

Naturally, the Awbury team maintains a close watch on geo-politics and economic factors in order to assess how they may impinge on the risks we have or may choose to accept within our portfolio and to ensure that, at all times, the ratio of risk to reward remains acceptable.

The Awbury Team

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Cultural appropriation…

While any self-respecting (re)insurer would not be taken seriously without a risk management process that established a Risk Appetite, set Risk Limits, and carefully managed potential aggregations across various factors and product lines, there is one area in which it can be somewhat harder to discern a company’s approach- namely, its Risk Culture, whose purpose should be to ensure that the enterprise not only survives, but prospers and achieves its objectives.

Unlike Mission Statements, articulations of Risk Culture tend not to be published, so one is often left guessing. What is also interesting is that formal definitions of what a Risk Culture is tend to be value neutral- for example (from RIMS) : “values, beliefs, knowledge, attitudes and understanding about risk shared by a group of people with a common purpose…”; which begs the question of what such a statement can be expected to clarify or signal, other than some commonality.

In reality, of course, any such statement is pointless without an overlay of judgement, as well as effective transmission both within and external to an enterprise where appropriate- and its content has to be applied.

So, how does one inculcate and embed a Risk Culture?

Firstly, the tone has to be set at the top, as a Risk Culture is a sub-set of an entity’s overall culture (and, in fact, co-dependent with it): it amounts to a “soft” control. If the consistent behaviour of a Board and senior managers does not set an example, it is naïve to expect that anyone else will pay much attention. The individuals responsible have to have a clear idea of the standards they expect to be adhered to, including by themselves, and a mechanism for ensuring that they are adhered to.

Secondly, expecting that individuals will all act ethically and appropriately at all times in the absence of factors other than their innate sense of what is “right” can be misguided: not because anyone should be considered amoral a priori, but rather because external factors and influences are important. “Good” people can do bad things and still consider themselves “good” because their value judgements have been influenced by factors such as fatigue, the “slippery slope” from minor to more serious transgressions, misplaced organizational loyalty, or inappropriate incentives. Therefore, the rules and goals of what is acceptable or expected have to be obvious, even if they are not set out in detail.

Thirdly, how the “culture” is safeguarded and transmitted is also important. In a (re)insurer, this responsibility will usually be assigned to the CRO, who will need to employ different approaches depending upon circumstances, because no single technique will be sufficient. So, the CRO will need to coach and build relationships; offer expert advice; be a steward of culture and ethics; and be willing to challenge decisions or behaviours that may adversely impact the entity’s success or reputation. Therefore, the role, particularly in a large, complex organization, is a demanding one, requiring a broad range of skills and attributes.

Everyone likes to believe that their organization’s Risk Culture is “fit for purpose”, but this can be difficult to demonstrate, as the concept can seem rather amorphous. As Andrew Bailey, Chief Executive of the FCA commented; “Culture is “everywhere and nowhere”… [it is] an outcome more than an input”

At Awbury, we are fortunate to have, in essence, grown together as a cohesive unit in building our business and franchise. We all interact frequently and comprehensively, and so are direct custodians of each other’s actions, individually and collectively. Given that our reputations and livelihood are inextricably and directly linked to the group’s continuing success, we believe that our culture and Risk Culture have become innate and inseparable. Of course, being Awbury, we would never assume that our approach is “the best”, nor that we should consider it immutable. However, we do believe that it is fit for purpose.

The Awbury Team

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